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Resignation of Corporate Counsel:
Fulfillment or Abdication of Duty
by
JAMES P. HEMMER*
Every attorney practicing corporate law encounters at some time the
question of whether it is legitimate to resign, or threaten to resign, from
an engagement. The issue can arise in a wide variety of contexts, for
example: threatening to resign in order to influence client conduct; resig-
nation in protest; and resignation to protect self-interest. In each in-
stance, the issue raises complex professional and, occasionally, ethical
questions regarding the practice of law and the proper role of counsel in
the corporate legal process. Resolution of these questions necessitates
analysis of both the legal and ethical considerations that govern the cor-
porate lawyer's conduct.
During the past decade there have been a number of major develop-
ments relating to both of these considerations arising in the practice of
corporate law. These developments include the rejection of the George-
town "whistle blowing" proposal,' the promulgation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) of its administrative interpretation of
the proper role of the lawyer in securities transactions, 2 the Kutak Re-
port, 3 and the adoption by the American Bar Association of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rules).4 These various de-
* Partner, Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, Chicago, Illinois; Member Chicago Bar. A.B. 1964,
Marquette University; LL.B. 1967, Harvard University.
1. See Exchange Act Release No. 16,769, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) t 82,501 (Apr. 30, 1980); Exchange Act Release No. 16,405, [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 82,144 (July 25, 1979); see also Gross, Attorneys and Their Corpo-
rate Clients; SEC Rule 2(e) and the Georgetown "Whistle Blowing" Proposal, 3 CORP. L. REV.
197 (1980) (advocating adoption of the proposal).
2. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980). Of particular
relevance is the proposed rule 1.13 and the comments thereto. Id. at 41-46. This Commission
was chaired by Robert J. Kutak.
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
RULES]. The ABA Model Rules and comments thereto appear in ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987).
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velopments and rules have had a profound effect on the traditional no-
tions of the lawyer's responsibility to his client and the public interest.
Nowhere is the cumulative impact of these developments upon the prac-
titioner greater than in the milieu of corporate mergers and takeovers. In
these transactions, the high incidence of conflicts of interest between
members of management, inside and outside directors, and present and
former shareholders often renders acute the problems of professional re-
sponsibility for corporate counsel.
This Article reviews the various sources for the standards that may
be applicable to counsel's conduct in this context. These sources are gen-
erally recognized to include both legal elements, which consist of stat-
utes, case law, regulations, and rules of professional conduct; and ethical
elements, which consist of personal moral considerations and the moral
and ethical precepts constituting the norms of conduct of the legal
profession.
5
At the outset, it should be recognized that personal moral considera-
tions do not represent a major source for the standards applicable to
these problems, although they necessarily are present in every human
endeavor. The relevance of such moral considerations in this analysis is
circumscribed as a consequence of the limited nature of the inquiry that
this Article considers: Whether counsel may resign an engagement that
already has been undertaken. The established rules of our legal system
define the expected norms of professional conduct and take complete pre-
cedence over the moral and ethical precepts applicable to the community
and population at large. 6 Although every lawyer has a set of standards
and morals that establishes certain personal norms of right and wrong,
5. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at xxix (1985 & Supp. 1986).
6. The philosophical issue of the legitimacy of such "precedence" in the unjust legal
system, which so occupied legal theorists following the Nazi experience, and which is also at
the heart of the civil disobedience controversy, simply is not germane to this Article. The legal
system under consideration here is not a patently or inherently unfair, inequitable, or immoral
system. To the extent that the above proposition raises any broader issue, that issue is only
whether the codes of standards drafted by professionals for themselves are self-serving. See
generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969), for a classic defense of the
development of such codes of standards. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) and Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981) for criticism of the old and new
ABA codes, respectively. Whether or not such codes are self-serving is not the relevant issue
for practitioners confronting the problems raised in this Article, because they are obligated to
observe the disciplinary rules adopted by their state courts. The broader philosophical issue is
not considered further herein for this reason, and also because counsel has the right to decline
the representation at the outset based on personal moral considerations. See infra text accom-
panying note 86.
[Vol. 39
RESIGNATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL
he may rely on those personal values in making professional decisions
only in discretionary areas, where no professional rules apply.
In the context of the problems that this Article analyzes, there are
few opportunities for counsel to elect a course of action based on nonpro-
fessional ethical precepts because the standards of professional conduct
are defined with a fair degree of specificity. Both the current and prior
versions of the rules of professional conduct restrict the lawyer's ability
to withdraw in many situations. The lawyer is free to choose whether or
not to undertake particular client assignments; but once undertaken, the
lawyer can repudiate the representation only if the reasons are
compelling.
Because the practice of law typically involves problem solving, as
contrasted with theoretical inquiry, this Article examines the sources of
these standards through analysis of six particular situations in which the
resignation issue arises: (1) potential involvement in a criminal act; (2)
facing risk of regulatory sanction; (3) threatening to resign in order to
influence client conduct; (4) defending the public interest; (5) protecting
one's own self-interest; and (6) observing the client confidentiality rule.
The following analysis of the six problems posed reviews the various
relevant standards and suggests some general conclusions regarding
those standards that counsel should employ in confronting and resolving
these dilemmas.
I. Duty to Uphold the Law: Participation in a Criminal Act
From a perspective of professional ethics, the simplest conflict to
resolve concerns potential involvement in criminal activity. Criminal
statutes and related case law provide abundant sources for standards of
conduct that are relatively clear; that is, clear as compared with the stan-
dards applicable in various noncriminal contexts. Example one impli-
cates such standards.
Example One:
Counsel for the Acquiror is at the printer, putting the final
touches on a hostile tender offer to be made the following morning at
fifty percent over the current market price of the Target's stock. The
Acquiror's chief executive officer lets slip that he has "tipped" a promi-
nent investment banker, who has purchased a substantial block of
shares of Target stock. 'Following the slip, he obliquely implies that it
may be possible to "cut counsel in" on some of the profit.
Everyone should recognize this situation. It is merely a variant of the
recent insider trading scandal that has involved the former takeover
chiefs and heads of risk arbitrage at some of the country's most respected
investment banking houses.
March 1988]
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Whether or not counsel may ultimately be cut into the fruits of the
manipulation, an intense dilemma confronts the practitioner at the mo-
ment of this disclosure. If he continues to represent the Acquiror, at a
minimum, counsel will probably be aiding and abetting a fraud. Thus,
for the honest corporate or securities practitioner who inadvertently may
come into contact with a potential fraud, the elements of an aiding and
abetting violation form a threshold standard applicable to counsel's
conduct.
Under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act),7 rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 8 and other antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, a participant in a transaction
generally will be held accountable as an aider and abettor if. (1) a second
participant committed a violation; (2) the first participant generally was
aware that his participation was part of the conduct that constituted a
violation; and (3) the first participant knowingly and substantially as-
sisted in the commission of the violation.9 A participating attorney would
also face potential civil liability for treble damages under the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act.10
A breach of rule lOb-5 also may be prosecuted criminally under sec-
tion 32(a) of the Exchange Act' I if the violation was "willful." Although
the term "willful" has not been construed uniformly by the courts in
criminal cases, generally that element will be satisfied if the defendant
acted voluntarily and intentionally.12 Continuing representation of the
Acquiror by counsel in example one would in all likelihood satisfy the
willfulness element, so that counsel would be guilty of participation in a
criminal fraud.
1 3
The established rules of professional conduct also specifically ad-
dress counsel's involvement in this type of activity and prohibit further
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
9. See SEC v. Washington County, 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1982); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Wood-
ward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
10. Section 21(a)(2) of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d)(2)
(Supp. III 1985), increases the sanctions under the Exchange Act for insider trading violations.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982 & Supp. III). Criminal violations of the federal securities
laws are not prosecuted by the SEC, but rather are referred to the United States Attorney
General.
12. See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 13.2, at 145 (1986); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395-96 (2d Cir. 1976).
13. Criminal fraud prosecutions often will involve additional charges, including conspir-
acy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
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participation. For example, rule 1.2 of the ABA Model Rules adopted
by its House of Delegates on August 2, 1983 provides in part "(d) A
lawyer shall not... assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent ... ." The official commentary interpreting the
ABA Model Rules recognizes that counsel's situation is "especially deli-
cate" when the client's criminal action has commenced and is continu-
ing, particularly because counsel may not permit revelation of the client's
wrongdoing. But the commentary concludes that such considerations
are secondary to the fundamental principle that the attorney must avoid
furthering the client's criminal conduct. 14
Thus, unless counsel in example one can persuade the Acquiror to
abandon completely its proposed hostile takeover, he must resign imme-
diately in order to avoid the risk of criminal prosecution. The resigna-
tion raises no meaningful professional dilemma. The established
professional rules proscribe further representation by counsel. For exam-
ple, the ABA Model Rules provide that a lawyer must withdraw from
the representation of a client if the representation will result in a viola-
tion of the law.15 The rules adopted by the highest courts of the various
14. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.2 comment (Criminal, Fraudulent and
Prohibited Transactions). For detailed consideration of the client confidentiality rule and its
impact upon counsel's conduct in the noncriminal context, see infra notes 110-29 and accom-
panying text.
15. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representa-
tion). Rule 1.16 provides in full:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct
or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's
ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the inter-
ests of the client, or if:
(I) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that
the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repug-
nant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding
the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
March 1988]
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states contain similar provisions.16
The above review of the legal and professional standards relevant to
the analysis of example one demonstrates that, in the context of potential
involvement in a criminal act, there is no meaningful uncertainty or am-
biguity regarding counsel's duty. The attorney must resign the engage-
ment, both to avoid furthering the client's criminal conduct and to
prevent becoming a participant therein.
II. Duty to Uphold the Legal Process:
Risk of Regulatory Sanction
When the relevant standard is an agency rule of procedure and the
criminal aspect is not present, the professional and ethical issues become
somewhat more complex. In the context of the publicly held corpora-
tion, the SEC has attempted quite aggressively to establish the appropri-
ate standard of professional conduct, at least with respect to disclosure
matters. Example two implicates that standard.
Example Two:
The management of the Acquiror refuses to disclose in the SEC
mandated disclosure materials an additional financial interest being
given to insiders of the Target, maintaining that it is not material.
Although the interest is minor, counsel for the Acquiror believes it to
be material and informs the Acquiror's board of directors of the dis-
pute. The board sides with management.
This situation presents the issue of counsel's responsibility when faced
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent rea-
sonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to
the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee
that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the
extent permitted by other law.
16. Since the ABA Model Rules were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on Au-
gust 2, 1983, nineteen states have codified the rules and another three states have incorporated
the substance of some Model Rules into their professional codes. Virtually all of the remaining
states have adopted the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Prior ABA Code) in
whole or in part. The Prior ABA Code, which was originally adopted by the ABA in 1969 and
had been amended subsequently, contained three parts: nine brief canons; 136 ethical consider-
ations (aspirational guides); and 41 disciplinary rules (DR).
Disciplinary Rule 2-110 of the Prior ABA Code provides in part as follows:
(B) Mandatory Withdrawal.
A lawyer ... representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employ-
ment, if ... he knows or if it is obvious that his continued employment will result in
the violation of a disciplinary rule ....
In this regard, DR 7-102(7) prohibits a lawyer from "counsel[ing] or assist[ing] his client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent ...." Disciplinary Rule 7-101(b)
further permits a lawyer to refuse to "participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful,
even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal."
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with an intransigent client. Should counsel resign? Is he obligated to
take more affirmative steps, such as "blowing the whistle" and, if so, to
whom?
Example two involves the dilemma faced by counsel as a result of
the administrative position first publicly asserted by the SEC in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp. 17 The case involved a civil injunctive
proceeding brought by the SEC against numerous defendants involved in
the merger of Interstate National Corporation (Interstate) into National
Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC). The defendants included the
law firm that represented Interstate in the merger as well as two of the
firm's partners.1 8 The court found that a comfort letter prepared by
NSMC's accountants, and delivered orally at the closing of the merger,
revealed that the financial statements NMSC used to secure Interstate
shareholder approval of the merger were materially inaccurate. 19 The
court also found that the two attorneys had aided and abetted2° Inter-
state's violation of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, which
prohibit closing the merger without resoliciting shareholders with cor-
rected financial statements, by failing to take any action to interfere with
the closing and consummation of the merger.2 1
From the perspective of the development of professional standards
of conduct, the case is rather unhelpful. The court concluded that it was
unnecessary to determine the precise extent of the attorneys' responsibili-
ties to their corporate client-that is, the steps that they were obligated
to take-because it was undisputed that they took no steps whatsoever to
delay the closing to allow disclosure to and resolicitation of the Interstate
shareholders. The court did hold, however, 'that at the very least the
attorneys were "required to speak out at the closing concerning the obvi-
ous materiality of the information and the concomitant requirement that
the merger not be closed" until full disclosure and resolicitation had been
effectuated. 22 The attorneys' silence lent "the appearance of legitimacy
17. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1987).
18. The case originally involved another prominent law firm as well. That firm, however,
entered into a settlement agreement with the SEC that incorporated new procedures to be
implemented by the law firm. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977).
19. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 705-09.
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text regarding the elements of the aiding and
abetting violation.
21. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 712. The court also made certain other
findings relating to SEC contentions of violations in connection with sales of NSMC stock
following the merger. Both these contentions and the related findings are extraneous to the
issues presented by the merger closing and, accordingly, are not treated in this Article.
22. Id. at 713.
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to the closing" and, in combination with the breach of their duty to
speak, provided "substantial assistance" to the merger closing (and
thereby to the antifraud violations). 23 Despite the finding of aiding and
abetting antifraud violations, the court declined to issue a civil injunction
because there was no showing of a likelihood of continuing violations in
the future by the attorney defendants.
24
The court also declined to adopt the SEC theory that counsel's opin-
ion, issued at the closing, provided substantial assistance to the antifraud
violation and that, accordingly, counsel should have "blown the whistle"
on their client by publicly withdrawing the opinion. The court summa-
rized the SEC's position as follows:
The SEC's contention with regard to counsel's alleged acquies-
cence in the merger transaction raises significant questions concerning
the responsibility of counsel. The basis for the charge appears to be
counsel's failure, after the merger, to withdraw their opinion, to de-
mand resolicitation of the shareholders, to advise their clients concern-
ing rights of rescission of the merger, and ultimately, to inform the
Interstate shareholders or the SEC of the completion of the merger
based on materially false and misleading financial statements.
25
The court essentially sidestepped this entire controversy by concluding
that once the merger was consummated, any subsequent action or inac-
tion by the attorneys could not "substantially assist" the violation, as
would be required for a showing of an aiding and abetting violation.
26
Most practitioners, including the author, find abhorrent the notion
that counsel must inform a governmental regulatory agency of the im-
proper conduct of a client. The notion directly conflicts with the com-
mon-law attorney-client privilege and the professional rules of conduct
governing lawyer-client confidentiality. 27 For a period of years, particu-
larly in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, this issue was
debated intensely by the securities bar and certain members of the staff of
the SEC.28 Various proposals were suggested, which would have imposed
23. Id.
24. Id. at 715-17.
25. Id. at 714.
26. Id. at 715. The court did acknowledge the significance of the issue. It noted that the
filing of the complaint had "generated significant interest and an almost overwhelming amount
of comment within the legal profession on the scope of a securities lawyer's obligations to his
client and to the investing public." Id. at 714. (citing Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate
Client's Crime or Fraud-the Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1404-05 n.38 (1978)
"[flor an extensive listing of articles dealing with the issue").
27. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.6 & comment (Confidentiality of In-
formation). Rule 1.6 is set out in full, infra note 109.
28. See, e.g., Evolving Problems for and Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 36 Bus. LAW. 1777 (1981) (program conducted by the ABA Section of Corp.,
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an affirmative obligation upon counsel to inform the governmental regu-
latory agency of client misconduct. 29 The Kutak Report30 and the draft
ABA rules were criticized severely by members of the bar as radical pro-
posals to change the traditional scope of a lawyer's obligations to the
client and to the public interest.31 Some speculated that the SEC would
act forcefully if the bar did not "appropriately" regulate itself.32 Follow-
ing the public administrative action of the SEC in 1981 and the adoption
of the new ABA Model Rules in 1983, the controversy subsided, how-
ever, without the imposition of any such radical obligation. 33
The SEC administrative action in National Student Marketing was
taken pursuant to rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice. 34 The unwill-
Banking and Bus. Law); Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1173
(1978) (conference sponsored by the ABA Section of Corp., Banking and Bus. Law).
29. For example, in Exchange Act Release No. 16,405, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 82,144 (July 25, 1979), the SEC requested written comments on the rulemak-
ing petition concerning the disclosure of relationships between registrants and their lawyers
known as the "Georgetown Proposal."
30. The ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, which was charged
with the task of reviewing and proposing revision of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (adopted 1969, as amended), was chaired by Robert J. Kutak. It issued a discussion
draft of Model Rules of Professional Conduct (known as the "Kutak Report"), which raised
the issue of when a lawyer must disclose client wrongdoing to a third party or to the public.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. See Pickholz, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Other Assaults
Upon the Attorney-Client Relationship: Does "Serving the Public Interest" Disserve the Public
Interest?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1841 (1981).
32. See Pitt, The Georgetown Proposals, 36 Bus. LAW. 1831, 1837 (1981).
33. Although it is too early to tell with any degree of certainty, the SEC recently may
have started a new chapter in its attempt to apply professional standards to securities law
concepts. On June 29, 1987 the SEC commenced an internal enforcement proceeding pursu-
ant to § 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act against Allied Stores Corp., and one of its directors who
is the head of the mergers and acquisition department of a major New York law firm. Admin-
istrative Proceeding No. 3-6869, No. 34-24,648, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
84,142 (June 29, 1987). The SEC has alleged failure to disclose defensive activities in Allied's
Schedule 14D-9 and, in effect, that the attorney-director was the sole person responsible for
"causing" the alleged nondisclosures. The filing has caused a great deal of publicity in publica-
tions generally, see, e.g.,A Top Law Firm Feels the Heat, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1987, at 40-41,
and severe criticism by members of the securities bar, see Klein, SEC Reopens Old Wounds
With Its Proceeding Against George C. Kern, Jr., I INSIGHTS 32 (Sept. 1987); Jensen, Securities
Bar Frets Over SEC Sanctions, 9 Nat'l L.J., July 13, 1987, at 3. It is uncertain whether the
SEC's current course of action will, in any case, result in any refinement of the professional
standards applicable to the issues that are the subject of this Article, because resignation is not
a relevant issue in the SEC proceeding and, more importantly, the proceeding involves the
additional factor that respondent was a director of the registrant.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1986). Rule 2(e) provides:
(e) Suspension and disbarment. (1) The SEC may deny, temporarily or permanently,
the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is
found by the SEC after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in charac-
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ingness of the courts to issue injunctions when there is no likelihood of
recurring violation, as in this case, is at least one of the principal factors
in the SEC's increasing use of rule 2(e) proceedings to govern the disci-
pline of professionals. 35 Although these proceedings are nonpublic un-
less the SEC directs otherwise, the National Student Marketing decision
was followed quite promptly by public decisions of the administrative
law judge and, on appeal, of the SEC itself in a proceeding against the
attorneys for National Telephone Company.36
The respondents in this proceeding were partners in a prominent
New York law firm that acted as counsel to National Telephone Com-
pany (National) in its disclosures to shareholders and its SEC filings dur-
ing the year preceding National's initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.
In the initial decision, the administrative law judge found that respon-
dents had willfully aided and abetted violations of the securities laws be-
cause, although National's management had repeatedly ignored counsel's
advice on required securities disclosures, counsel had taken no affirma-
tive steps to obtain corrective action.37 On appeal, the SEC essentially
agreed with the administrative law judge's findings of fact. But the SEC
dismissed the findings of aiding and abetting violations because it had not
previously adopted applicable standards of professional conduct for at-
torneys, and it believed retroactive application of a new standard would
be unfair. 3
8
The SEC used the occasion of this administrative decision to an-
nounce its interpretation of "unethical or improper professional con-
duct," as that term is used in rule 2(e)(1)(ii), which would be applicable in
future disciplinary proceedings. The SEC interpretation provides:
The SEC is of the view that a lawyer engages in "unethical or improper
professional conduct" under the following circumstances: When a law-
yer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
ter or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or
(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of the federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 80b-20), or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
35. See Siedel, Rule 2(e) and Corporate Officers, 39 Bus. LAW. 455, 457-59 (1984), for a
compilation and analysis of the increase in recent years in the number of such proceedings
instituted against attorneys.
36. In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C 82,175 (Mar. 7,
1979); In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
37. In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ' 82,175 (Mar. 7,
1979).
38. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substantial and con-
tinuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued
participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt
steps to end the client's noncompliance.
39
Of course, this interpretation does not contain any specific delineation of
the steps that counsel must take; but in the following paragraphs of the
release, the SEC did suggest what those steps might be.
In the SEC's view, initially it is sufficient for the attorney to counsel
accurate disclosure. If the client persists in a continuing course of viola-
tion, however, the attorney must take more affirmative steps, such as a
direct approach to the board of directors, to individual directors, or to
members of management. The SEC expressly rejected the suggestion
that, in most cases, counsel must resign:
Premature resignation serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-
client relationship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of
the securities laws. The lawyer's continued interaction with his client
will ordinarily hold the greatest promise of corrective action. So long
as a lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting reasonable efforts to
prevent violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations
have been met.4°
The SEC acknowledged, however, that if the misconduct is irretrievable,
"a lawyer has no choice but to resign. ' 41
In a footnote, the SEC observed that its interpretation did not re-
quire an attorney to disclose a client's illegal act either publicly or to an
affected third party.42 It suggested that a then-existing disciplinary rule
of the ABA might be so interpreted, but the interpretation of that ABA
rule was never developed and the rule has since been superceded. 43
The foregoing review of the applicable agency rule of procedure,
SEC Rule 2(e), indicates that in example two, counsel does not have any
39. Id. at 84,172.
40. Id. at 84,172-73.
41. Id. at 84,173.
42. Id. at 84,173 n.78.
43. The SEC was referring to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B), which required a lawyer to
reveal information necessary to "rectify" a "fraud upon a person or tribunal." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1969). The rule was amended by the ABA
in 1974 and interpreted in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 341 (1975) (prohibiting such disclosure to that the extent the information constitutes
"confidences"). Further, the term "tribunal" was defined to include a governmental agency
only in the context of a hearing or proceeding. See The Code of Professional Responsibility of
Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice-A Report by the Committee on Counsel Responsi-
bility and Liability, 30 Bus. LAW. 1289, 1299 (1975). The amended rule was adopted in cer-
tain states. It is now superceded by new ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), which limits such
attorney disclosure to instances involving crimes likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm. See infra note 121-25 and accompanying text.
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obligation to inform the regulatory authorities of the client's miscon-
duct." But does that standard compel counsel to resign? To reach this
determination, counsel must conduct a deliberate and thorough analysis
of the materiality of the disputed disclosure. On the assumption that the
practitioner's view of its materiality remains unchanged, counsel should
then exert his best efforts in an attempt to change the client's nondisclo-
sure decision. But if these efforts prove unsuccessful, in view of the SEC
administrative position and the supporting case law, it seems that resig-
nation is the minimum counsel must do to avoid potentially severe SEC
sanctions. As in the criminal example above, the resignation raises no
meaningful professional dilemma because the same rule of professional
conduct would apply.45
The "blowing the whistle" aspect of the SEC disclosure issue con-
fronted in example two tends to distort or magnify the professional and
ethical concerns actually presented. Because there is an SEC agency rule
and a clear interpretation thereof, whether the SEC had express author-
ity to promulgate the rule and to regulate attorney conduct in this man-
ner is moot; the standard has been upheld and applied by the courts. 46
Although practitioners can argue that it should not apply as it does,47
they, nevertheless, are both legally and professionally obligated to ob-
serve it.
44. Even blowing the whistle does not insure that the attorney will be insulated from civil
liability. As a participant in the transaction, the attorney still may be sued by defrauded pur-
chasers as an aider and abettor of the alleged violation. See Moore v. Fenex, Inc., [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,103 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 1987) (attorney, who had pre-
pared a circular for an oil and gas drilling offering circular, was found not liable for aiding and
abetting, since he had notified the Ohio Securities Division upon learning that the promoter
was not segregating investor funds as required). For discussion of this case, see infra note 84
and accompanying text.
45. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16. The rule is set forth in full, supra note
15.
46. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979). See Siedel, supra note 35. at
461-64, for a criticism of this decision and an exposition of the argument that rule 2(e) is
invalid in any type of disciplinary proceeding.
47. Articles dealing with the SEC's implementation of Rule 2(e) in attorney disciplinary
proceedings include: Dolin, SEC Rule 2(e) After Carter-Johnson: Toward a Reconciliation of
Purpose and Scope, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 331 (1981); Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse
of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 774 (1979); Ferrara, Administrative Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings Under Rule 2(e), 36 Bus. LAW. 1807 (1981); Kelleher, Scourging the Moneylenders
from the Temple: The SEC. Rule 2(e) and the Lawyers, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801 (1980):
Klein, The SEC and The Legal Profession: Material Adverse Developments, I 1 INST. ON SEC.
REG. 604 (1979); Note, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e). 79
MICH. L. REV. 1270 (1981).
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III. Duty to the Client: The "Threat to Resign" Ploy
In the SEC disclosure example, an administrative agency regulation
provides the applicable standard. But what standard governs counsel's
conduct in a situation in which neither criminal violation, civil liability
nor agency sanction is an issue? Do the ABA Model Rules provide sat-
isfactory guidance for those areas of practice in which no legislative or
regulatory prescription controls? Consider example three.
Example Three:
Counsel represents a publicly held corporation with an independ-
ent "outside" board of directors that has a high regard for counsel's
firm. Management of the corporation is negotiating the sale of a sub-
sidiary to the subsidiary's operating officers for cash and a secured
note. Both management of the parent corporation and counsel have
good reason to believe that the subsidiary may not have sufficient capi-
tal after the buyout to continue operations. Management disparages as
ultraconservative counsel's advice that the corporation will face a sub-
stantial risk of a fraudulent conveyance suit and the voiding of its lien
if it sells the subsidiary. In an attempt to influence the client's con-
duct, counsel threatens to resign if management continues with the
transaction without raising these concerns before the corporation's
board of directors.
This example presents at least two levels of inquiry. The first, and
more basic, inquiry focuses upon who is the client in the corporate con-
text. The second is whether it is ever legitimate for a practitioner to use a
ploy or artifice in his dealings with the client. In response to the first
inquiry, the general consensus is that corporate counsel owes allegiance
to the corporation itself, rather than to management or to any individual
associated with the corporation.48 The persons who initially engage the
attorney on behalf of the corporation do not have the right to subse-
quently control the attorney's conduct. Similarly, the individuals whose
function it is to work with the attorney do not have the unfettered right
to control counsel's conduct. The attorney owes an independent duty to
the corporation to determine what is in its best interest.49
The ABA Model Rules stress that a corporation acts through its
duly authorized "constituents" (i.e., officers, directors, employees, and
shareholders), and that customarily the decisions of those constituents
must be accepted by the lawyer "even if their utility or prudence is
doubtful."'50 "Operations and policy" are not the lawyer's province.5 1
48. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 82,847, at 84,171 (Feb. 28, 1981); ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule
1.13(a); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1981).
49. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 5, at 234-35.
50. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13 comment (The Entity as the Client).
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These rules, however, recognize two instances in which it is justifi-
able for the attorney to seek review of a determination or action at a level
higher than the individuals who are normally responsible. 52 These in-
stances include: (i) when a violation of a legal obligation to the corpora-
tion is at issue, and (ii) when a violation of law, likely to result in
substantial injury to the corporation, may be imputed.53 Under either of
these circumstances, the lawyer is granted wide discretion to seek recon-
sideration of the matter, another opinion, or referral of the disputed issue
to a higher authority.
54
51. Id.
52. The applicable rule, rule 1.13 (Organization as Client), has no counterpart in the
Disciplinary Rules of the earlier ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
53. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13(b).
54. ABA Model Rule 1.13 provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act
in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organi-
zation, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In
determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the serious-
ness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's repre-
sentation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the
person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any
other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include
among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presenta-
tion to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that
can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest au-
thority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to
act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, share-
holders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it
is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the pro-
visions of rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required
by rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization
other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
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In example three, the second set of circumstances arguably may ap-
ply: fraudulent conveyance liability, if realistic, would constitute a viola-
tion of civil law likely to result in substantial liability to the corporation.
In this example, the legal analysis is complicated by reason of the fact
that very few courts have considered the issue of imposition of fraudulent
conveyance liability upon former shareholders or secured lenders in the
context of a leveraged buy-out (LBO).5 5 Some courts have questioned
whether fraudulent conveyance law is even applicable to leveraged
buyouts.5 6 There is, however, some decisional law voiding the lien of a
secured lender, and holding former shareholders liable for proceeds re-
ceived from the sale of stock in a LBO.57
If for no reason other than the enormous number of LBO transac-
tions in recent years, it may be expected that there will be additional
developments in the immediate future in this area of law.58 At the same
time, however, there are a number of defenses available to former share-
holders and secured lenders, and the fraudulent conveyance issue disap-
pears entirely if the LBO candidate prospers in its future business
operations. Thus, any realistic assessment by counsel in example three
must conclude that the risk to the corporation is limited, and that there is
therefore no genuine risk of any derivative or participatory liability on
the part of counsel.
In this circumstance, the professional rules clearly do not compel
counsel to resort to a higher authority. As a matter of fact, the real
inquiry should be whether they even permit counsel to go over the heads
of the corporation's authorized representatives. The issue is extremely
complex and involves consideration of counsel's relationship with the cli-
ent, including counsel's proper role (if any) in the client's business judg-
ment and the client's expectations as to the type of services to be
rendered by its attorney.
The professional rules place the onus of determining whether to go
55. See Cook & Schwartz, At a Troubled Company, Officers and Directors Owe Creditors
First, 9 Nat'I L.J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 23-24.
56. See Credit Managers Assoc. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D. Cal. 1986);
In re Anderson Indus. Inc., 55 Bankr. 922, 926 (W.D. Mich. 1985); In re Knox Kreations,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567, 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
57. See United States v. Gleneagles Investment Corp., 565 F. Supp. 556, 584-85 (M.D.
Pa. 1983), affd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 (3d
Cir. 1986); In re Answerfone, Inc., 48 Bankr. 24, 29 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Spanier v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 591-94, 623 P.2d 19, 21-25 (Ct. App. 1980). But see In re
Greenbrook Carpet Co., 722 F.2d 659, 661 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding payments on a collateral-
ized loan not to be fraudulent transfers).
58. See Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 829, 832-33 (1985).
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over the heads of the corporation's authorized representatives directly on
the attorney. 59 This is quite properly a recognition that ultimately it is
the practitioner who must decide whether his conduct and advice are
legitimate. In example three, the outside board of directors has a high
regard for counsel's firm and presumably comparably high expectations
of the representation to be rendered. If the board would fault counsel's
firm for representing the corporation in a transaction that resulted in
messy litigation, then counsel's determination to challenge the position of
management is legitimate. It does not matter whether counsel's motiva-
tion is simply fear of the loss of a client or of a besmirched reputation, or
a more noble desire to protect the client. These kinds of motivational
considerations are inevitably present in difficult issues that affect both the
client's interest and the attorney's self-interest.
Counsel's motivation is not determinative of the legitimacy of his
conduct. Rather, it is the nature of the client's expectation of "the scope
and nature of the lawyer's representation" 60 that should be the control-
ling factor in the determination of whether counsel must go over the
heads of the client's designated representatives. Of course, one of the
fundamental problems with the proposition that ultimately counsel must
determine the nature of the client's expectations lies in the personal qual-
ities inherent in the attorney making that determination. It is no secret
that successful corporate lawyers generally are not lacking self-confi-
dence, assertiveness and, on some occasions, even arrogance. Thus, it is
to be expected that some corporate lawyers will assume, without justifica-
tion, that the client desires their business as well as professional judg-
ment. But this merely reflects the tensions inherent in applying theory in
practice. The ABA Model Rules exhort counsel to make this application
"through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment."'6'
Assuming a relatively dispassionate analysis by counsel of the cli-
ent's expectations and predicament, the second question raised at the
outset of this example remains: whether it is legitimate for a practitioner
to use a threat to resign as a ploy or artifice in his dealings with the
client. The answer is provided by the foregoing analysis of the other
issue discussed in connection with this example, namely, the identity of
the client.
As we have seen, in the corporate context the client typically is the
organization itself and not the individual officers and employees through
whom it acts. If counsel in example three legitimately determines that
59. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13(b).
60. Id.
61. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, preamble (emphasis added).
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the corporation's expectations of the representation are different from
those being requested by the corporate agents, then counsel has wide dis-
cretion to seek reconsideration, to resort to a higher authority, or to pur-
sue other measures. 62 Under the professional rules counsel would even be
permitted to withdraw when the client makes the representation unrea-
sonably difficult. 63 Clearly counsel should be permitted to take the lesser
measure of threatening to resign in order to achieve the client's expecta-
tion. To that extent, counsel's use of such ploy or artifice in his dealings
with the corporation's representatives, as in example three, is
appropriate.
IV. Duty as a Public Citizen: Defending the Public Interest
Some practitioners who act as counsel to large publicly held corpo-
rations, or who otherwise practice in the realm of corporate finance, be-
lieve that a part of counsel's professional responsibility is an obligation to
the public interest.64 This generally is translated into an obligation to the
corporation's stockholders. Example four presents a vehicle in which to
examine whether the corporate lawyer has a professional responsibility
or legal duty to the corporation's shareholders, or whether personal
moral considerations obligate the attorney to place the public interest
above that of the corporate client.
Example Four:
Counsel represents a Target whose shares are being purchased in
the open market by a potential Acquiror. Target's management pro-
poses to sell its crown jewel to a white squire at a marginal price, hav-
ing good reason to believe the potential Acquiror wants the crown
jewel and probably will go away if it is sold to a third party. Counsel
regards management's course of conduct as not in the best interests of
Target's shareholders.
Does corporate counsel owe a duty to the corporation's sharehold-
ers? The better view rejects that notion. The board of directors has a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders in this context. A wealth of recent
62. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13(b). The full text of rule 1.13(b) is
set forth supra note 54.
63. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16(b)(5).
64. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1401, which discusses the theme articulated by three
former SEC commissioners to the effect that, in the nonlitigation context, there are times when
the lawyer must subordinate the client's interest to that of the public. See also The Emerging
Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)
% 79,631, at 83,689-690 (speech by A.A. Sommer, Jr.) (Former Commissioner Sommer sug-
gests that in nonadvocacy matters, the role of the securities attorney should be more akin to
that of an auditor than an advocate).
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takeover cases makes that very clear.65 The imposition of a duty upon the
board is meaningful: The board can, and should, act on the sharehold-
ers' behalf. Counsel, however, cannot effectively do so.
Of course, as seen in the previous example, counsel does, under cer-
tain conditions, have an obligation to bring the issue to the board's atten-
tion. If counsel is denied access, he may legitimately threaten to, or
actually, resign. But what if counsel receives an audience with the board,
and it determines to ignore counsel's advice? What justification could
there be then for counsel to resign on the basis of an obligation owed to
shareholders?
Rule 1.13 of the ABA Model Rules provides that if, despite the law-
yer's appeal to the corporation's highest authority,66 the corporation in-
tends to pursue a course of action "that is clearly a violation of law and is
likely to result in substantial injury" to the corporation, the lawyer may
resign. 67 The author submits that this professional rule will seldom per-
mit counsel to resign. In practice, potential violations of law typically are
not "clear," particularly if they involve elements of business judgment
beyond the sphere of counsel's expertise. Example four is a case in point.
But even if the violation were clear, the professional rule would only
permit resignation; it does not compel the attorney to withdraw.
Recognition of this point is very important. It is the express pur-
pose of the professional rules generally to provide the attorney with a
certain amount of discretion. The professional rules are not designed to
create legal duties that give rise to a cause of action against the attorney
upon a violation; rather, they are intended to provide guidance to attor-
neys in their practice, and to establish a regulatory structure for state
disciplinary agencies.
68
Further, in placing discretion with the attorney, the rules admonish
65. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,863 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
66. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13 comment (The Entity as the Client)
suggests that although the board of directors of a corporation typically will be its highest
authority, there may be instances in which that authority rests elsewhere, such as in the in-
dependent outside directors.
67. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13(c) (emphasis added). As proposed by
the Kutak Commission, Rule 1.13 had a provision allowing "loyal disclosure" (whistle blow-
ing) to third parties when the lawyer had exhausted all internal review mechanisms. That
provision was not adopted by the ABA House of Delegates. As adopted, the strongest action a
lawyer may take is to resign, but resignation must be triggered by harm to the corporation, not
to third parties. See id. Rule 1.13(c).
68. Id. preamble.
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that counsel's actions are to be taken in a manner that minimizes disrup-
tion of the corporation and the risk of revealing confidential information
to third parties.69 ABA Model Rule 1.16(b), dealing with "optional with-
drawal," also cautions that such resignation is permitted only if it can be
done without material adverse effect on the client's interests,70 if the cli-
ent insists upon an objective that is "repugnant or imprudent, '71 or if
other good cause exists. 72 Thus it is apparent that in a situation such as
that presented in example four, the professional rules do not impose upon
counsel any professional obligation to the corporation's shareholders.
The "good cause" for resignation referred to in ABA Model Rule
1.16(b)(6) obviously would exist if counsel had a legal duty to the corpo-
ration's shareholders. In National Student Marketing, 3 discussed in
connection with example two, the court seemed to conclude that counsel
has at least an "indirect" obligation to the shareholders. The court
stated that inaction or silence could constitute "substantial assistance"
for purposes of aiding and abetting liability if the defendant had a duty to
disclose. 74 In reaching that conclusion, the court relied upon a number
of cases that it conceded were "distinguishable, in that they contem-
plated disclosure to an opposing party and not to one's client."'75 None-
theless, the court regarded the cases as sufficiently analogous to provide
support for a duty to shareholders. The court articulated it's reasoning as
follows: "[T]he attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate client re-
quired them to take steps to ensure that the information would be dis-
closed to the shareholders. ' 76 This ambiguous statement is doubtful
support for the finding of a direct duty of corporate counsel to sharehold-
ers, particularly in view of the court's declining to elaborate upon the
69. Id. Rule 1.13(b).
70. See supra note 15 for the full text of ABA Model Rule 1.16.
71. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16(b)(3).
72. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(6). The Prior ABA Code did not contain a comparable provision.
However, DR 2-1 10(c)(l)(e) of the Prior ABA Code provided for permissive withdrawal if the
client "insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that
is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer although not prohibited under the disci-
plinary rules... ." This provision actually would permit counsel more flexibility in the context
of example four than does ABA Model Rule 1.16(b) when that rule is read in conjunction with
the limitations upon withdrawal imposed by ABA Model Rule 1.13. It should be noted that
the provisions of Model Rule 1.13 provide a much more structured framework within which
corporate counsel must operate and, in that sense, impose greater duties upon such counsel in
respect to his obligations to the corporate client.
73. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1987).
74. Id. at 713.
75. Id. The cases cited were Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975);
Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
76. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 713.
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steps that counsel must take beyond the minimal requirement that he
"speak out at the closing."' 77 The court's opinion, however, does under-
score counsel's obligation to present his contrary opinion to his client in
an effective manner.
The National Student Marketing court considered any further re-
finement of the obligations of corporate counsel unnecessary for purposes
of its decision. Implicit in that conclusion is the belief that if the defend-
ant attorneys had spoken up, called for resolicitation, and withheld deliv-
ery of their closing opinion, the merger probably would not have been
consummated. In all likelihood that is correct, but it is basically un-
helpful for purposes of the present analysis. Typically, in the difficult
situations encountered in practice, the issue for counsel's determination
is not as clearly defined as the materiality of the undisclosed NSMC
information.
A number of other courts have also considered whether there exists
a fiduciary relationship (or other duty to disclose) between a securities
purchaser and an attorney participating in a securities transaction; such
courts generally have concluded that no such duty exists. The leading
case on the duty to disclose issue is Chiarella v. United States,78 which
held that a person trading in securities must disclose material inside in-
formation only if such person has a legal duty to disclose.79 Such a duty
arises only if there is an agency relationship, a fiduciary relationship,8 0 or
a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties.8 1
While Chiarella involved the disclosure duty of persons trading in
securities, the attorney participating in a securities transaction typically
will not be trading or tipping inside information to persons who are trad-
ing. The Ninth Circuit has developed a five-factor, flexible duty test to be
77. Id. at 715-17; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
78. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
79. This case involved a criminal prosecution under rule lOb-5 of an employee of a finan-
cial printer who handled tender offer documents. The employee had bought shares of the
targets before the public announcement of the offers. The Second Circuit upheld the jury
conviction on a theory of misappropriation of nonpublic information. United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978). Seven months after the Supreme Court reversed the
circuit court, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the SEC adopted rule 14e-3 in
response. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987). This rule, which became effective October 14, 1980,
prohibits insider trading based upon a prospective tender offer.
80. A fiduciary would include any corporate insider such as an officer, director or con-
trolling shareholder. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
81. Id. at 232. The relationship referred to by the Court in Chiarella is one between the
defendant and the securities purchaser or seller. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5,
11 (2d Cir. 1983), the court included persons who have a relationship of trust with the issuer in
the category of those who have the required "relationship of trust and confidence."
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applied in such nontrading and nontipping situations. 82 This test re-
cently was applied to attorneys. The court in effect determined that an
attorney does not owe a disclosure duty to the ultimate securities pur-
chaser if the attorney derives no benefit from the transaction other than
professional fees. 83 The benefits to the attorney must include some con-
nection to the transaction at issue, such as ownership of shares that were
the subject of the transaction. Otherwise, there is not a sufficient nexus
between the defendant's conduct and plaintiff's claimed damages.
84
Counsel's legal duty to the corporation's shareholders, however, can
also arise in other contexts. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently rec-
ognized that a fiduciary relationship can exist between' an issuer's attor-
ney and a securities purchaser, but only when special trust has been
reposed in the attorney, and both parties to the transaction understand
that such trust has been placed in the attorney.85 In essence, this requires
that the shareholder have a reasonable expectation that the attorney is
acting on the shareholder's behalf, which seldom will be the case in con-
ventional securities, merger or takeover transactions. In this sense, the
principle of the case is essentially the same as that of Chiarella; namely,
no duty to disclose exists unless there is some sort of special relationship
between the attorney and the shareholder.
In the absence of either a general legal duty or a professional respon-
sibility of counsel to the corporation's shareholders, the question remain-
ing is whether personal values justify the lawyer's elevation of the "public
interest" above the interest of his client. Stated in another way, the ques-
tion is whether there can be a meaningful distinction between counsel's
82. See Sweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979); White v. Abram§,
495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974). The five factors to be considered under the flexible duty
test are:
1. the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
2. the defendant's access to information as compared to the plaintiff's access;
3. the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship with the plaintiff;
4. the defendant's awareness of whether plaintiff was relying on their relationship in
making his investment decisions; and
5. the defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.
Id.
83. Mirotznick v. Sensney, Davis & McCormick, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
93,137 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 11, 1986).
84. Id. at 95,615. The case arose out of the Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS) bond default. The court granted the motion to dismiss the rule 10b-5 claims against
the attorneys who had issued the initial opinions regarding their utility clients' participation in
the WPPSS projects.
85. Moore v. Fenex, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,103 (6th Cir. Jan. 14,
1987). This case arose under Ohio law. The fiduciary duty aspect of the case sought to hold
liable an attorney who had prepared an offering circular that omitted to disclose that the of-
feror had failed to segregate investor funds, as required, in an oil and gas drilling program.
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obligations as a member of society on the one hand, and as a lawyer on
the other, in the context of the problems considered in this Article.86
Of course, every individual has a particular character and a sense of
right and wrong. One's moral standards and sense of self-esteem may
prompt fairness and candidness in one's personal relationships. By be-
coming a lawyer, however, an individual subjects himself to a set of pro-
fessional obligations, which restricts the manner in which he functions
and may operate as a professional. These obligations impose upon the
attorney a duty of loyalty to the client to preserve client confidences,
rather than a duty to be fair and candid to the public as a whole.
Perhaps the point is best illustrated in the criminal context, particu-
larly when an attorney represents a confessed murderer. In this situation
counsel faces a moral dilemma. Regardless of personal moral standards,
the attorney has a professional duty to do everything in the his power to
obtain an acquittal. For the lawyer, the actual issue of morality is
whether to take the case. An attorney may believe that he has a moral
duty not to do so and may properly refuse to represent such a client.
Under the rules of professional responsibility, however, the attorney who
does take the case is required to represent the client to the best of his
ability so as to achieve acquittal. 87
The situations that this Article analyzes, involving the resignation of
counsel, are all premised upon counsel "having taken the case." Thus,
the issue is not one of personal morality but of professional responsibility
to the client in accordance with the applicable legal and professional
standards. The imposition by counsel of personal morality or belief as the
factor determinative of the conduct of a publicly held corporation is not
in the public interest. Ultimately, the standard governing a professional's
conduct cannot come down to a set of personal values. As a practical
matter, there must be a more objective standard that governs the lawyer-
client relationship, and that is the purpose that laws and the rules of
professional conduct serve.
The resignation of counsel, as the legal representative of a large pub-
licly held corporation, can cost many thousands of dollars simply to
bring new counsel "up to speed." More importantly, it can involve ad-
verse publicity, or "signals" to counter parties, which may in the end be
86. For the reasons discussed supra note 6, any broader philosophical issues raised by this
question are not considered in this Article. For recent criticism in this vein of the ABA Model
Rules in the corporate context, see Riger, The Model Rules and Corporate Practice-New Eth-
ics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729 (1985).
87. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 5, at xxix.
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improperly determinative of a client's course of conduct.8 8 Thus, even
when withdrawal is mandatory, rule 1.16(d) obligates the attorney to
take steps to protect the client's interest and to minimize the harm to his
client. In the context of resignation, counsel simply cannot impose his
personal views at the expense of his professional responsibility.
The rules of professional conduct prescribe that a client is entitled to
representation that is both competent and diligent.8 9 In the context of
dilemmas such as that presented by example four in which there is no
question of criminal violation or of personal liability on the part of the
attorney, the client is entitled to representation by counsel who will de-
fend the client's interests without an improper conflict of interest and
who will see the representation through to completion. 90 A resignation
that jeopardizes the client's chosen course of conduct would be an abdi-
cation of that professional responsibility. This is particularly true when,
as a business matter, there may be some grounds for disagreement as to
what is in the best interests of the client's shareholders.
Example four is just such a situation, involving essentially nonlegal
issues of economic valuation and third-party motivation. Under these cir-
cumstances, the resignation of counsel could prove very disruptive to the
client's chosen course of action. Thus, resignation actually would be an
abdication, rather than a fulfillment, of counsel's duty. Continued inter-
action with the client, in which counsel seeks to achieve modifications
intended to accommodate the interests of all concerned, is a much prefer-
able course for counsel in fulfilling his professional obligations.
V. Duty of Loyalty: Protecting One's Own Self-Interest
We have now seen that the attorney has a professional obligation to
determine the legitimate expectations of the client (ie., the corporate en-
tity) and to place those expectations ahead of his personal values and
views. From a perspective of professional ethics, are the considerations
different when there is a risk of personal liability on the part of the attor-
ney? Example five focuses on this issue for purposes of consideration of
the relevant standards.
Example Five:
Counsel represents a Target which has received a leveraged
buyout proposal in the form of a cash tender offer for all its shares.
Members of management have been offered equity participation in the
88. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for discussion of continuing obligations of
counsel after withdrawal.
89. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.1 (Competence) & Rule 1.3 (Diligence).
90. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16 comment.
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Acquiror and long-term employment contracts. A few years earlier,
Target deflected a hostile tender at virtually the same price, but the
earlier corporate raider had made it plain that management would be
replaced. Target's successful deflection of that offer, on the basis that
the price was inadequate, was due largely to counsel's efforts. Target's
performance and stock price have been flat since that earlier offer.
Counsel expects the filing of a plaintiff's class action suit challenging
the present transaction.
It is not much of an exaggeration to state that virtually every "visi-
ble" management LBO is challenged in one fashion or another by a
plaintiff's class action suit. In example five, it is probably realistic for
counsel to be concerned that if he participates in the transaction, he will
probably be joined as a defendant-presumably on an aiding and abet-
ting theory. 91 Is it legitimate for counsel to resign, thereby diminishing
the likelihood of being included as a defendant?
To suggest that counsel should have steered clear of this troubling
predicament in the first place does not help the analysis. Counsel may
have believed in good faith that the price of the first offer was inadequate.
Of course, at the same time it is undeniable that the posture counsel took
had the result of permitting him to retain a lucrative client.
From the perspective of the client's expectations, this problem su-
perficially may appear to be just a variant of example four, the breach of
duty problem. But is it governed by the same ethical considerations?
From the perspective of counsel who finds himself in this dilemma, the
answer has to be emphatically in the negative. The critical difference is
that in example five counsel is involved personally.
If counsel genuinely believes that the transaction faces a lawsuit in
which he would be a defendant, and that he realistically faces personal
expense or liability, it is perfectly legitimate for him to tender his resigna-
tion. The principle that counsel is not obligated to subject himself to
sanction or liability was clearly established in the analysis of examples
one and two above. A lawyer may resign if the representation will result
in unreasonable financial burden to the lawyer or if it has been rendered
unreasonably difficult. 92 Being a prospective defendant in a lawsuit quali-
fies on both of these grounds. Even if counsel ultimately may be entitled
to indemnity from the client, such recovery is uncertain at best. 93 Sub-
91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussion of the elements of such liability).
92. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16(b)(5).
93. The corporation laws of the various states generally permit corporations to indemnify
officers, directors, employees, and agents for expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred in
civil cases, and also for judgments or amounts paid in settlement in third party actions not
brought by or in the right of the corporation. The term "agents" may be broad enough to
include attorneys acting on behalf of the corporation within the scope of the indemnity provi-
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jecting oneself personally to antifraud litigation as part of a legal engage-
ment certainly comes within the scope of an "unreasonably difficult"
representation.
The professional standards for permissive withdrawal in this case
are not qualified by a corresponding obligation to take into consideration
the client's interests. They recognize that counsel may tender his resigna-
tion even if such withdrawal cannot be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the interests of the client.94 The point of this recognition
is that counsel does not owe an unlimited duty of loyalty to the client.
Of course, loyalty is an essential element in counsel's relationship
with his client.95 A lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to
have an adverse effect on representation of the client.96 In the context of
conflicts between the client's interests and the lawyer's own related busi-
ness interests, it is readily apparent why the attorney may not permit his
own interests to interfere with representation of the client. The conflict
rules, however, are also concerned with other situations in which con-
flicts may materially interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment in
advising or acting for the client, and they do not require that in all in-
stances counsel subordinate his interests to that of his client. Rather, the
conflict rules proscribe representation of the client if that representation
would be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility to his own,
nonbusiness interests.9
7
The legitimacy of a client's expectations is also a meaningful consid-
eration in the conflicts area and may serve to illustrate the foregoing pro-
scription. The nature of a client's legitimate expectations varies
sions in most states, but such indemnification typically is not mandatory. The statutory provi-
sions generally are permissive, and require action by each individual corporation to implement
such indemnification. Further, even if the form of indemnity adopted by the corporation were
broad enough to apply to attorneys, such indemnity generally is permissible only if the indem-
nified party acted in good faith and in a manner that such person reasonably believed to be in
or at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145 (1986). As a consequence of limitations and restrictions such as the foregoing, statu-
tory indemnity provisions typically provide little comfort to counsel faced with a dilemma
such as that presented by example five.
94. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16(b).
95. See id. Rule 1.7 comment (Loyalty to a Client).
96. See id. Rule 1.7 comment (Lawyer's Interests).
97. ABA Model Rule 1.7 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third per-
son, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
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depending upon the range or degree of the lawyer's services. If counsel is
retained in only a very limited connection (for example, when in connec-
tion with an acquisition counsel is asked to give closing real estate opin-
ions related to property in a single state), the claim to counsel's
undivided loyalty is quite thin. But if counsel is acting as general counsel
and is privy to the client's secrets and confidences, the client's loyalty
claim is very broad. When counsel cannot provide that loyalty, legiti-
mate client expectations also require counsel to resign.
In this regard, the framework of the loyalty rule coincides with the
withdrawal rules discussed above. Although the loyalty rule itself does
not speak directly to the issue of the conflict between the lawyer's respon-
sibility to his client and the lawyer's interest in his own integrity, reputa-
tion, and financial well being, that conflict is addressed elsewhere in the
rules and is recognized as presenting one of the most difficult issues of
professional discretion. 98 Thus, the issue that a situation such as example
five ultimately raises is counsel's ability to exercise sound judgment in
weighing the risk to himself against the extent to which he has an obliga-
tion to stand fast and to work the problem out to a satisfactory resolu-
tion. It is not simply a matter of whether counsel's own interests
supercede the duty of loyalty to the client. Rather, the matter is one of
the extent of counsel's duty to the client, and of the proper balancing of
counsel's interests with those of the client.
In any complex corporate transaction, various alternatives will be
available to the client that may serve to reduce the actual risk presented
by a potential shareholder suit. Before considering resignation, it is the
responsibility of counsel to present these alternatives to the client repre-
sentatives. Counsel's duty to represent the client competently and, if pos-
sible, to completion, will necessitate counsel to exert his best efforts to
persuade the client to implement measures designed to minimize or to
eliminate altogether the danger represented by a potential shareholder
suit. In example five, these measures could include the engagement of
impartial experts (e.g., investment bankers or other financial experts) to
review the fairness of the LBO price and terms, and the formation of a
committee of independent directors to review and possibly even to nego-
tiate the terms of the proposed transaction.99 Such measures could also
98. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, preamble, which suggests that issues such as
this are to be "resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment
guided by the basic principles underlying the [ABA Model] Rules."
99. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the importance of such committees in establishing the fairness to minor-
ity shareholders of transactions with corporate insiders and affiliates. See McCune & Van
Kirk, Leveraged Buyouts By Management, 16 REV. SEC. REG. 769, 776-77 (1983) (discussion
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encompass a variety of other alternatives, including a recommendation
that the absence of pending litigation be a condition to the closing of the
transaction.
The dilemma presented to the attorney in counseling such measures
is that their independent nature may run counter to, or achieve results
contrary to, the objectives of the client representatives with whom coun-
sel is dealing. Prior to counseling measures designed to minimize or
eliminate the attorney's personal conflict, the attorney should make the
"identification of client" and "legitimate client expectations" analyses re-
viewed in connection with example three above. Not surprisingly, these
analyses may suggest that the client (as distinguished from the client rep-
resentatives) should be counseled to pursue such measures, as is the case
in example five. It is only when the practitioner's own interests prevent
him from either conducting these analyses and counseling the client ac-
cordingly, or from impartially implementing the measures selected by the
client, that the lawyer must withdraw.
The balancing of these various interests requires counsel to exercise
exceedingly sensitive professional judgment, but that is no reason to pre-
fer premature withdrawal. Corporate counsel who practice in the rari-
fled atmosphere of complex corporate mergers and takeovers routinely
engage in judgments of a highly sophisticated nature. Their exercise of
such judgments upon related professional and ethical issues is little more
than a continuation or minor extension of their normal course of busi-
ness. Resignation, however, remains the appropriate professional re-
sponse if either the client's chosen course of conduct, or the development
of the situation, presents counsel with a conflict that materially interferes
with his professional judgment in advising or acting for the client.
VI. Duty to Preserve Confidences: The Client
Confidentiality Rule
The professional and ethical problems of corporate merger and take-
over practice frequently tend to be less clearly defined than in the above
examples. Often counsel will be called upon to face the issues considered
above in a context when many, if not all, of the foregoing considerations
are present. Example six presents such a situation:
Example Six:
Counsel represents the Target in a negotiated LBO. Two elder
officers-directors and the one outside director are retiring. Counsel
learns from the two younger officers-directors, who are continuing as
of such special committees and notation of SEC administrative proceedings in which the SEC
required appointment of a special review person to represent public shareholders).
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equity participants in the LBO, that they believe the revenue projec-
tions in the freezeout merger proxy statement (prepared in good faith
by their older counterparts) are very conservative, and that the Target
is worth considerably more than the transaction price. They instruct
counsel, however, not to raise the issue of their optimism with the
elder officer-directors. Counsel has a reasonable expectation of ongo-
ing representation of the operating company after the consummation
of the transaction. What should counsel do?
Based upon the analysis in example two above, securities counsel
must use their best efforts to insure that the corporation's disclosure deci-
sions are made only after the client has been informed of all relevant
considerations. If necessary, counsel must initiate this decision-making
process.
The duty to disclose projections of future performance in freezeout
merger proxy statements, such as that of the Target in example six, has
received a fair amount of interpretation. An amendment to SEC Sched-
ule 13E-3,10 0 which specifies the type of information required to be filed
with the SEC in a Rule 13E-3 Transaction Statement'0 1 in connection
with a going-private transaction by the issuer or its affiliates, has been
proposed to require disclosure of projections of revenue and income (or
loss) per share. 10 2 The SEC, however, has not acted upon the proposal. 103
The Sixth Circuit adopted a basic rule that such going-private dis-
closure materials must include "soft information" (such as asset apprais-
als) only if the predictions underlying the information are substantially
certain to hold.1 0 4 Nevertheless, because such appraisals and income pro-
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1986).
101. Id. § 240.13e-3(e).
102. The amendment was proposed in Exchange Act Release No. 16,076, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,167 (Aug. 2, 1979).
103. Historically, the SEC has discouraged the disclosure of financial projections and
other soft information, as likely to mislead investors. See South Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa
Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo.
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973). But the SEC position encountered substantial
criticism, which led to the SEC's adoption of rule 175, which provides a safe harbor for "for-
ward-looking statements." See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections,
Exchange Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C 82,117
(June 25, 1979). This rule permits disclosure of financial projections on a voluntary basis, but
does not impose any duty to disclose such information.
104. Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986):
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195
(1986); cf., Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that disclosure
of such information may be impermissible when the estimates were not made with reasonable
certainty). Other circuits have reached varying results regarding the proper test as to the
existence of a duty to disclose financial projections. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Industries.
Inc., 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1389 (1987) (no duty to disclose
financial projections because of their uncertainty and potential to mislead investors); Flynn v.
Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984) (case-by-case approach): Panter v.
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jections are customarily shown to acquirors, lenders, and other third par-
ties in connection with the structuring of the transaction, such soft
information is regularly included in the disclosure materials to share-
holders as well. This obviates any potential claims either of breach of
duty to disclose material inside information, or of failure to disclose in-
formation to public shareholders that was provided to insiders or other
interested parties.
In example six, the Target has undertaken voluntary disclosure of
its future projections. Thus, there is no question here relating to a failure
to disclose. Similarly, whether it was prudent for the Target to disclose
projections that are less than reasonably certain is not an immediate legal
concern. For counsel representing the Target, the problem is that when
voluntary disclosure of future projections has been undertaken, the Tar-
get must make the full disclosure necessary to prevent the statements
from being misleading. 10 5 Presumably, if the optimism of the younger
officers has any validity, some additional disclosure could be made sug-
gesting that future results may actually be more favorable than projected
if certain alternative assumptions or conditions were achieved. Such "al-
ternative assumption" disclosure is relatively common in going-private
and other issuer tender offer statements.
The difficulty for counsel in going over the heads of the younger
officers-directors lies in the recognition that if their assumptions have
merit, those assumptions could have the effect of increasing the price of
the transaction. If counsel were responsible for such an increase, any
expectation of continuing representation of the operating company
would probably be unrealistic. Thus, counsel has a substantial personal
interest in not raising the issue. But, based upon the standards that we
have previously examined, does counsel nevertheless have a duty to raise
the issue?
We have seen that counsel does not owe a general legal duty or a
professional responsibility to the Target's shareholders that would re-
quire him to raise the issue, and that personal moral considerations do
not provide an independent justification for doing so. Further, it is un-
realistic to suggest that counsel actually faces a risk of liability for aiding
and abetting in a situation such as example six, in which the projections
were prepared in good faith by the senior members of management with
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (no duty to
disclose financial projections).
105. See Walker, 802 F.2d at 710; Panter, 646 F.2d at 292; Vaughn, 628 F.2d at 1221.
responsibility therefore.' 0 6 Similarly, the analysis in example two has
shown us that counsel faces risk of regulatory sanctions by the SEC only
in situations in which there is a violation of law by the client and counsel
is neither acting in good faith nor asserting reasonable efforts to prevent
the violation. 0 7 The risk of personal sanctions is surely minimal when
the likelihood of a finding of violation of law is doubtful.
Nonetheless, the analysis of the proper course of conduct for coun-
sel under these circumstances does not end there. The absence of either a
violation of law or an express legal duty do not exhaust the problematic
possibilities. As we have seen in example three, counsel still has an obli-
gation to fulfill his professional responsibility to the client, which necessi-
tates that counsel determine the identity of the client and the client's
legitimate expectation. The dilemma for counsel in fulfilling this obliga-
tion is whether the potential conflicts of interest would either prevent
him from impartially making the determination of the client's legitimate
expectations, or materially interfere with the objectivity of his profes-
sional judgment in advising or acting for the client. In example six, the
potential conflicts include not only counsel's interest in continuing repre-
sentation of the client, but also the divergent interests of the senior and
younger members of management. Under these circumstances, counsel
may legitimately inquire, as a threshold question, whether resignation
would constitute a fulfillment rather than an abdication of his duty to the
client. That inquiry, however, quickly implicates another duty of coun-
sel, namely, the duty to preserve client confidences.
Counsel in example six can probably resign without creating a more
problematic situation, if the Target's disclosure materials are not yet on
file with the SEC. If the disclosure materials are already on file with the
SEC, and counsel believes that they should be amended, as a practical
matter the problem may be considerably more difficult. If counsel re-
signs at that point, the SEC will probably have to be advised thereof in
some fashion or other.'0 8 If the SEC seeks an explanation, "the lawyer's
106. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussion of the elements of aiding and
abetting liability).
107. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172-73 (Feb. 28, 1981).
108. The SEC has very elaborate disclosure rules in the case of changes in an issuer's
independent public accountants, which require disclosure of the existence and nature of any
material disagreement and the effect thereof on the issuer's financial statements. See Item
304(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304(a) (1987); Item 4 of Form 8-K, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 31,003 (1987); Item 9 of Part II of Form 10-K, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C
31,104 (1987); Item 9(d) of Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1986). The SEC rules also
require disclosure of the resignation of one of a registrant's directors because of a disagreement
with the registrant on any matter relating to the registrant's operations, policies, or practices.
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responsibility is especially delicate."' 10 9 The lawyer is not permitted to
reveal the client's potential disclosure violations," l0 even after withdraw-
ing from the engagement.'' In the somewhat analogous context of a
court's request for an explanation of a proposed withdrawal by counsel,
it has been suggested that the "lawyer's statement that professional con-
siderations require termination of the representation should ordinarily be
accepted by the court as sufficient."' 12 Perhaps such a explanation would
also suffice in this context. To the extent that it may not, the issue raises
difficult issues regarding the manner of dealing effectively with the SEC
in a way that does not itself result in some misstatement."1
3
In In re Carter, 114 the SEC observed that association of a law firm
but only if the director has furnished the registrant with a letter describing the disagreement
and requesting that the matter be disclosed. See Item 6 of Form 8-K, % 31,003, at 21,996. This
rule would apply to an attorney who is a director, but would not obligate such attorney to
"blow the whistle." The SEC has no explicit disclosure rules with respect to a change of the
issuer's counsel.
109. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.2 comment (Criminal, Fraudulent and
Prohibited Transactions).
110. Id. Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly au-
thorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
111. Id. Rule 1.6 comment (Withdrawal). The comment provides, in part, that "[a]fter
withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosures of the client's confidences
." Id.
112. Id. Rule 1.6 comment (Mandatory Withdrawal).
113. In the similar context in which a registration statement is on file (as contrasted with a
tender offer or going-private statement), rule 477(a) permits withdrawal of the registration
statement by the issuer if the SEC consents, but rule 477(c) requires the registrant to state fully
the grounds upon which withdrawal is being made. 17 C.F.R. § 230.477 (1986). Thus, if coun-
sel objects to a registration statement already on file and withdraws because the client remains
intransigent, the client has an extremely difficult task. The client must find new counsel who
will undertake the assignment (presumably after discussing the matter both with the registrant
and resigning counsel). Although the registrant is not obligated to withdraw its registration
statement, the withdrawal of counsel may as a practical matter compel such action. If it does,
then the client at that point must also attempt to make a satisfactory nonmisleading explana-
tion to the SEC. Under the circumstances, this would be no easy task.
114. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) f 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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with a client's action may lend an air of legitimacy or authority that
would otherwise not be present." 15 The association itself may make pos-
sible or facilitate a transaction that would not transpire in its absence.
The conclusion that the SEC would draw from this premise is that coun-
sel may not permit his firm, or himself, to be used in the manner that the
younger officers would use counsel in example six, if counsel reasonably
believes the disclosure materials may be materially deficient and may
therefore perpetuate a fraud on public shareholders." 16
It also has been suggested that, in very limited instances, reasonable
third-party expectations may impose on the securities lawyer a duty to
disclose client confidences: for example, where the "lawyer's transac-
tional presence is so public and crucial" that a third party reasonably
may be relying on that presence as evidence of the absence of crime or
fraud. 1 7 This formulation of counsel's "duty," however, is simply an-
other variant of the SEC's "attorney presence" theme, from the perspec-
tive of an "expectations" analysis. But can third-party expectations serve
as a proper basis for a test of corporate counsel's conduct? In the opinion
of the author, such a proposition seems highly dubious.
Third parties reasonably can expect that the corporate attorney will
not be participating in, or otherwise aiding or abetting, a crime or fraud.
As we have seen in the analyses of examples one and two, if the attor-
ney's presence crosses the line of legality, the duty to uphold the law
requires that counsel resign. No third-party expectation test is needed to
achieve that result. But following satisfaction of the fundamental duty to
uphold the law, the attorney's obligation is to his client. Typically, in
both adversarial and nonadversarial situations, the expectations of the
adversary or a third party will run counter to the client's expectation.
In approaching this clash of expectations in the criminal context, it
is important to recognize in mind that the sixth amendment's guarantee
of the right to assistance of counsel implicitly must include a guarantee
of the client's expectation of unfettered representation by loyal coun-
115. Id. at 84,169.
116. This SEC position, when reduced to its essentials, is nothing more than a variant of
the basis for asserting aiding and abetting liability. See supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussion of the offense of aiding and abetting); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text
(rejecting the SEC's claims in National Student Marketing relating to use of counsel's opinion).
Thus, the SEC's position provides a helpful standard only to the extent that the elements of the
aiding and abetting offense are otherwise present, or counsel otherwise fails to satisfy his pro-
fessional responsibility to end the client's noncompliance with the federal securities laws. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text for discussion of the SEC's establishment of this latter
standard in the Carter case.
117. Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1419-20.
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sel.118 It has been suggested that this guarantee does not permit the gov-
ernment or professional regulatory associations to determine either what
the client's interests are or how they are to be protected. Rather, it is the
right of the client to establish both his own interests and his expectations
of the manner in that counsel will protect or achieve those interests.1 19
Imposition of any disclosure obligation based upon third-party expecta-
tions would conflict directly with one of these fundamental client expec-
tations expressed in the client confidentiality rule.
Similarly, a resignation that risks disclosure, or defeats a colorably
legitimate client objective, presents a fundamental conflict with this rule.
The very integrity of our adversarial legal system is premised upon the
principle of client confidentiality. In almost all cases, the public is best
served when the client is encouraged to consult freely with counsel, when
counsel is protected from fear of reprisal, and when the client is free from
fear that his confidences will be revealed, even indirectly.1
20
Thus, Model Rule 1.6 limits attorney disclosure of client confidences
to two situations: the future crimes exception contained in Model Rule
1.6(b)([); and the attorney self-defense exception contained in Model
Rule 1.6(b)(2).121 Most of the public controversy during the discussions
of the ABA's new rules was caused by Rule 1.6.122 The rule was criti-
cized as being too narrow,12 3 particularly when two exceptions proposed
by the Kutak Commission were rejected by the ABA House of Dele-
118. See Freeman, Recent Governmental Attacks on the Private Lawyer as an Infringement
of the Constitutional Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 36 Bus. LAW. 1791, 1793-97 (1981).
119. Pickholz, supra note 31, at 1843-44.
120. Ferren, The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW. 1253,
1255 (1977).
121. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.6(b)(l)-(2). Rule 1.6 is set forth in full text
supra note 110.
122. For a discussion of the historic role of counsel in resisting encroachments upon the
attorney client relationship and the attorney-client privilege, respectively, see Pickholz, supra
note 3 1, and Borow, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine in the Corpo-
rate Content, 36 Bus. LAW. 1863 (1981).
123. The disclosure provisions of the Prior ABA Code were broader than ABA Model
Rule 1.6. Compare the permissive disclosure provisions of ABA Model Rule 1.6(b), set forth
in full text at supra note 109, with the mandatory and permissive provisions of DR 4-101(c)
and (d), which provides as follows:
(c) A lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the extent it appears neces-
sary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in death or seri-
ous bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law or the rules of
professional conduct.
(d) A lawyer may reveal
(1) confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them;
(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under disciplinary rules or required
by law or court order;
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gates.124 These exceptions would have permitted disclosure to rectify a
crime or fraud that the lawyer unwillingly helped to bring about, or as
required to comply with the law.
125
In considering the ABA's rejection of these exceptions, the breadth
of the professional rule on confidentiality must be fully appreciated.
Whereas the common-law attorney-client privilege applies only to com-
munications between the client and his attorney relating essentially to
matters of legal advice, the professional rule of confidentiality applies to
all information relating to the attorney-client relationship. 26 The attor-
ney may not disclose such information whether it relates to factual mat-
ters, legal advice, or other information.
Furthermore, the exceptions to the confidentiality rule are primarily
discretionary, not mandatory. Even in the case of the attorney's learning
that his client intends to commit a crime in the future, or of the attor-
ney's right to disclose client misdeeds as a method of self-defense, the
attorney is not obligated to make such disclosures. 127 Although some
critics argued that the ABA should permit broader disclosure, the ABA
ultimately concluded that this would conflict with the fundamental prin-
ciple that our legal system should encourage the client to speak candidly,
openly, and fully in his dealings with his attorney. 28 Thus, the Preamble
to the ABA Model Rules suggests that the exercise by counsel of his
discretion not to disclose a client confidence should not be subject to
reexamination, since any review of the attorney's determination would be
incompatible with the general policy of encouraging free, open, and full
communication between an attorney and his client.
12 9
Applying this principle to the continuing LBO participants in exam-
ple six (i.e., the two younger officer-directors), those individuals should
be encouraged to speak candidly and openly with counsel, and without
fear that their confidences will be disclosed, or that such disclosure will
(3) the intention of a client to commit a crime in circumstances other than those
enumerated in paragraph (c) above; or
(4) confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.
124. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 5, at 88.
125. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, at 21-26 (Discussion Draft
1980).
126. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 5, at 91.
127. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.6(b); see supra note 111.
128. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 5, at 101-02. See also Postema, Moral Respon-
sibilities in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 63 (1980), for a philosophical and moral
analysis of the obligation to remain silent.
129. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 4, preamble.
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lead to the aborting of the transaction. This is a reasonable and legiti-
mate expectation, and one that counsel should endeavor to satisfy, pro-
vided that it does not conflict with the other duties and responsibilities to
which counsel is subject.
A premature resignation by counsel, whether it is motivated by an
over-developed sense of obligation to the public interest or by a self-pres-
ervation instinct, conflicts with counsel's obligation to his client (the cor-
porate entity) and to its representatives (both the older and younger
members of management). Counsel has an obligation to serve all of these
client interests, to attempt to resolve the matter and to seek alternative
solutions satisfactory to all. For example, counsel might recommend
that for the protection of all interests, including those of the board of
directors and of management, the Target obtain a comfort letter from the
its independent accountants with respect to the financial projections. In
rendering such an opinion letter, the accountants typically would make
inquiries of all relevant parties to obtain their views regarding the as-
sumptions underlying the projections.
If, however, the younger officers continue to attempt to place a
"gag" on counsel, the obligation to the client entity requires that counsel
take more affirmative measures. As we have seen in the analysis of exam-
ple three, one obvious measure is to present the matter directly to the
senior members of management. Another, and perhaps less confronta-
tional, measure is the threat to resign. In an ongoing engagement, the
threat to resign is a powerful weapon to influence client conduct that is,
or at least borders on, irresponsible or illegal.130 In the context of exam-
ple six, the result of such a threat would probably be agreement to a
minor additional disclosure, possibly only in a footnote, of potentially
more favorable results under alternative and more optimistic assump-
tions. An adjustment in the transaction price is extremely unlikely in the
absence of intervention of additional parties or of other factors.
The pressure by counsel to include the additional disclosures should
be exerted in a manner that appears to the client representatives as the
highest level of professionalism and service to the client. It is submitted
that if counsel's representation has been of a fine caliber, the younger
client representatives will respect the attorney's talents and abilities, and
counsel will have a fair chance at continuing the relationship following
consummation of the transaction. Through this course of conduct-by
avoiding premature resignation and continuing to interact with the client
and all its representatives---counsel will fulfill the obligation to represent
130. Ferren, supra note 120, at 1269.
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the client to completion, without risking a breach of the client confidenti-
ality rule and while doing his best to achieve the fullest disclosure possi-
ble under the circumstances.
Conclusion
Counsel has a professional responsibility to represent the client to
the best of his ability, which entails bringing problems before the proper
client representatives and attempting to resolve matters in the client's
best interest through creative strategies and thorough, dogged work. In
the corporate merger and takeover context, this responsibility typically
will require counsel to conduct a thorough and painstaking analysis of
the identity of the true client, and a determination of the client's legiti-
mate expectations, including those relating to loyalty of counsel, mainte-
nance of confidences, and competent and diligent representation to
completion of the assignment.
This responsibility will also require that the determinations reached
by counsel following such analysis, and counsel's actions in furtherance
thereof, be consistent with the obligations to uphold the law and main-
tain the integrity of the legal process. If counsel finds it impossible to do
this, then resignation of the engagement represents the ultimate expres-
sion of his fulfillment of professional duty. Resignation generally is a
legitimate professional response, however, only if the transaction involves
potential criminal violation, professional sanctions, personal liability of
counsel, or an inability adequately to represent the client due to denial of
access to the legitimate client representatives or because of conflicts of
interest. Even under such circumstances, counsel's responsibility as a
professional obligates him to use his best efforts to serve the interests of
the client. Counsel should continue to interact with the client and its
representatives as long as possible in an attempt to achieve alternate solu-
tions consistent both with the client's legitimate expectations and coun-
sel's legal duties and professional responsibilities.
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